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Nuclear security and Somalia
Eric Herring , Latif Ismail, Tom B. Scott and Jaap Velthuis
University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
ABSTRACT
Scholars have not regarded Somalia as a place of relevance to thinking about nuclear security. This
article gives four reasons why this perspective is not well founded. First, as the state strengthens it
needs an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security regime for the control of
nuclear materials. Second, it has unsecured uranium reserves that could be smuggled abroad.
Third, those unsecured uranium reserves could be accessed by terrorists for use in a ‘dirty’ bomb.
Fourth, there is evidence of past ‘ecomafia’ intent and planning, and possible success, in dumping
radioactive waste on land in Somalia or in its territorial waters. The article proposes an innovative
system of uranium ore fingerprinting, covert sensors, mobile phone reporting and surveying and
evaluation capabilities that would address all four issues. The proposed system would include
a low-cost method for turning any smart phone into a radiation detector to crowdsource reporting
of possible nuclear materials, plus aerial and underwater drones with low cost radiation sensors.
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Introduction
Somalia is not a country usually associated with nuclear
security issues. However, there are four reasons why
Somalia needs a system of nuclear security. First, as
the state rebuilds and increasingly functions domesti-
cally and internationally, it needs an International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security regime,
that is, an internationally coordinated overall approach
to governing nuclear materials and associated activities.
Somalia has made some preliminary steps towards this
but still has a long way to go (IAEA, 2013). Second,
Somalia has notable uranium reserves (see Figure 1), but
no capability to deter, detect and prevent the illicit
extraction and export of this radiological material. In
the 1960s and 1970s Somalia granted a number of inter-
national licences to prospect for and mine its uranium
ore but these plans did not come to fruition (IUREP,
1983, IV.2). Nevertheless, its main uranium deposits are
surficial deposits which are easily accessible. Third, ter-
rorists could put uranium ore in a dirty bomb which
uses conventional explosives or other means to disperse
radioactive material. Somalia’s main uranium deposits
are in Galmudug Federal Member State (FMS), where
there is a significant al-Shabaab (AS) and growing
Islamic State (IS) group presence. Fourth, Somalia has
no capability to evaluate scientifically claims of nuclear
waste dumping inland or off its coast, or to engage in
containment or clean up. As we report below, extensive
Italian Parliamentary investigations over many years
prove beyond doubt that Italy’s ‘ecomafia’ intended
and planned to exploit Somalia’s state collapse in 1991
to dump radioactive waste on land in Somalia and in its
territorial waters secretly and illegally. In other words,
this is not merely rumour, speculation or conspiracy
theory. In this article we debunk some false claims and
show where others are overstated while still underlining
the point that in some cases intent and planning to
dump nuclear and other toxic waste in Somalia have
been established conclusively. What remains unresolved
is whether such dumping did in the end occur; the
Italian Parliamentary investigations and those of other
actors such as the United Nations (UN) have concluded
that it is plausible that they did, with a number of
specific possible sites identified (see Figure 1). This
issue is a matter of intense and widespread interest
among Somalis up to the present (e.g. Aidarus, 2019),
and this includes when the anti-piracy EU Naval Force
(EU NAVFOR) gives community outreach presenta-
tions. If any such claims made over the past thirty
years are true, there is a risk of environmental and
human hazards through accidental exposure, and the
risk of terrorists acquiring such materials. Even if the
planned dumping did not occur, Somalia needs to have
a system to monitor its radiological materials. The con-
tinuing resonance of this issue is illustrated by the fact
that a young Somali, Adam Matan, raised the matter
with then US President Barack Obama in 2016 in
a televised town hall exchange (Soohan Media, 2016).
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This article proposes a nuclear security system for
Somalia that addresses the needs identified above
regarding nuclear materials management and prevent-
ing nuclear smuggling, nuclear dumping and nuclear
terrorism. It could be a key component of an IAEA-
approved overall nuclear security regime that Somalia
needs to have as part of the process of becoming an
IAEA member. For all these reasons, this article is of
potentially major significance for security and develop-
ment within and beyond Somalia. Once developed, the
infrastructure could, with some additional training and
equipment, also be applied to non-nuclear toxic
hazards. This article is the first scholarly output on
nuclear security and Somalia. Except for occasional
brief discussions of toxic waste dumping (e.g.
Weldemichael, 2019, p. 26–30), no scholarly research
has been published before on Somalia and IAEA mem-
bership or nuclear smuggling, terrorism or dumping.
The article outlines in two sections what a nuclear
security system for Somalia might look like. The first
section sets out in turn the main nuclear issues facing
Somalia – its lack of an IAEA nuclear security regime; its
vulnerability to smuggling of uranium ore; potential
terrorist access to uranium ore for use in a ‘dirty’
bomb; and the history of likely and proven illegal intent
to use it as a site for nuclear waste dumping. The second
section outlines the technical characteristics of a nuclear
security system that would address these issues and
provides a summary of the expected results from
deploying such a system. The conclusion briefly inte-
grates the elements of the argument into an overall case
for the proposed nuclear security system.
Nuclear issues and somalia
Somalia’s uranium ore deposits have been public knowl-
edge since at least the late 1960s. Although small in
global terms, Somalia’s main uranium reserves are sub-
stantial, unsecured and close enough to the surface for
strip mining (see Figure 1 and New York Times, 1968;
Hussein, 2007; 2013). The main uranium deposits are in
Galmudug FMS in central Somalia. Somalia has an
estimated 10,200 tonnes of uranium reserves, with
7,600 tonnes of it potentially commercially recoverable,
Figure 1. Somalia: Uranium deposits and main alleged nuclear waste dumping sites.
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though at relatively high expense (IUREP, 1983, IX.3;
NEA and IAEA, 2018). The Alio Ghelle uranium ore
deposit in South West State FMS is also unsecured but
scattered, relatively far underground and of low grade
(IUREP, 1983, IX.2.2, IX.3; The Diggings, No date).
Uranium could be extracted from the unsecured
Hamar betafite deposit in western Somaliland but it
too is small scale and low quality with the additional
challenge of being outside the normal areas of operation
of AS and IS (IUREP, 1983, IX.2.1). For these reasons,
the Alio Ghelle and Hamar deposits appear to be insig-
nificant in relation to nuclear security. Nevertheless,
a nuclear security system along the lines proposed here
could evaluate this further using the IAEA’s risk-
informed framework and monitor their status. As the
Galmudug deposits are large, near the surface and in
a relatively insecure area, the uses of the system should
prioritise them. We now discuss in turn the four nuclear
security issues identified.
Lack of an IAEA nuclear security regime
Somalia does not have what the IAEA calls a nuclear
security regime, the essential elements of which are:
state responsibility for nuclear security; a nuclear legis-
lative and regulatory framework; regulation of interna-
tional transport of radioactive material; offences and
penalties for violating nuclear regulations; commitment
to international cooperation on nuclear issues;
a capability to identify and assess nuclear security
threats; a system for identifying and assessing targets
of illicit nuclear activity and possible consequences of
that activity; use of a risk informed approach in asses-
sing nuclear threats; a capability to detect nuclear secur-
ity events; an ability to respond to an adverse nuclear
security event; and a commitment to sustaining the
nuclear security regime. Somalia is not a member of
the IAEA but has begun preparations for such an appli-
cation (Herring, FGS, IAEA, 2016-19). It is an open
question as to when it will apply, as there are many
serious and competing demands upon the state, which
has limited capacity. The IAEA and Somalia have each
named Points of Contact for their interactions and
Somalia was represented at the IAEA’s first nuclear
security school in Egypt in 2016. To assist Somalia in
establishing its nuclear security regime, the IAEA
Division of Nuclear Security worked with Somalia’s
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources to pre-
pare a confidential Integrated Nuclear Security Support
Plan (INSSP) in June 2016 that identified key activities
to be carried out over 2016–2019. This plan was
informed by Somalia’s submission via the IAEA
Nuclear Security Information Management System
online self-assessment questionnaire. It appears to be
the case that progress has been minimal. The IAEA and
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) agreed to con-
duct an INSSP Review Mission in 2019 but to date that
has not happened; if implemented, the nuclear security
system we propose could be considered as part of that
review.
Vulnerability to smuggling of unsecured uranium
ore
At present Somalia is vulnerable to the possibility that
some of its unsecured uranium ore will be smuggled
abroad. In 2006 the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia
claimed that Iran had supplied arms to the Islamic
Courts Union (ICU) – the alliance of Islamic courts
which dominated South Central Somalia that year. It
also claimed that ‘there were two Iranian personnel in
Dhusamareeb [capital of Galmudug] engaged in matters
linked to uranium in exchange for arms for [the] ICU’
(UN SC, 2006, para., p. 89). Iran denied the claim about
the arms and ignored the one about uranium ore. While
the UN provided detail in relation to the arms it did not
do so in relation to the uranium. Iran increased its
engagement with Somalia from 2012 onwards as the
new internationally-supported FGS began to consoli-
date. Due to the use of carrot and stick diplomacy by
Saudi Arabia, Somalia severed diplomatic relations with
Iran in 2016. In 2016 and 2017 Iranian weapons arrived
covertly in the Puntland semi-autonomous FMS of
north-east Somalia (UN MGSE, 2017, 29–31, 107–11),
while in 2018 the UN reported the systematic smuggling
of charcoal from Somalia to Iran (UN MGSE, 2018,
46–48, 142–152).
While there are, as we have just indicated, two-way
smuggling channels between Somalia and Iran, claims
of smuggling of uranium from Somalia to Iran seem to
be false, even though there has been a more general
pattern since the 1990s of verified attempts to steal,
smuggle or sell African uranium ore or uranium yellow-
cake, with motives and parties involved unclear and
disputed (Mutua, 2015). In August 2017 then Foreign
Minister of Somalia Yusuf Garaad Omar wrote a letter
to US Ambassador Stephen Schwartz in which he
asserted the following: ‘This issue can be summed up
in a single word: uranium . . . Al-Shabaab forces have
captured critical surface exposed uranium deposits in
the Galmudug region and are strip mining triuranium
octoxide for transport to Iran’ (Omar, 2017). Omar
appealed to the US for immediate military assistance.
Triuranium octoxide (U3O8 – also known as uranium
oxide or yellowcake though it is usually brown or black)
is produced through the mining, milling and chemical
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processing of uranium ore in preparation for subse-
quent enrichment for fuel or weapons. We do not
know the basis or origins of Omar’s claim and he pro-
vided no evidence. His claims are unlikely to be true.
Strip mining and industrial processes for producing
uranium yellowcake would require heavy machinery
and large-scale facilities that have never existed in
Somalia, that AS and IS do not have and that would be
easily visible to satellite monitoring and to Somalia’s
population and local authorities. One item reporting
Omar’s claim contained a photo captioned ‘Uranium
mines in Somalia’ (Cochi, 2017). An online reverse
image search shows that it is actually a photo of the
Rössing uranium mine in Namibia. Furthermore, Iran
produces yellowcake from its own uranium ore and
imports uranium yellowcake from other countries
such as Kazakhstan. This is all open and internationally
permitted, and so covert importation of Somali uranium
ore would be pointless and politically risky. The fact that
the Trump Administration did not react to Omar’s
assertion, even though it is hostile to Iran and even
though Omar’s letter was reported on Fox News which
President Trump follows closely, suggests that the claim
was not taken seriously (Herridge & Gibson, 2017).
Despite the fact that this particular claim is implausible,
the discussions around these rumours show that the
possibility of smuggling of Somalia’s unsecured ura-
nium ore is a concern.
Potential terrorist access to materials for
radioactive dirty bombs
As the option of using a dirty bomb containing uranium
ore to create fear and disruption more than physical
harm is currently open to AS and IS in Somalia, action
to remove that option is prudent. In its official propa-
ganda IS has expressed explicit interest in acquiring
a nuclear weapon (Saul, 2015), whereas there is no
record of statements from AS about its attitude to
nuclear materials. A dirty bomb spreads radiological
material through an explosion or other means and is
also known as a radiological dispersal device. A dirty
bomb can cause physical harm to people by direct con-
tamination, while the need for decontamination will
inflict economic costs and cause wider disruption.
Such a bomb can also generate fear and political con-
sequences on a scale far larger than the direct physical
threat would suggest. Uranium ore could be gathered in
Somalia through low-tech small-scale excavation
(WNA, 2018). Intact uranium ore is not a major radi-
ological threat, being primarily an alpha (not gamma)
radiation emitter. However, the particles that would be
produced by a uranium ore dirty bomb would be
a serious threat to health if inhaled or ingested. Efforts
to educate people about the limited direct physical
threat in order to reduce fear make sense but are not
a substitute for proper controls on radiological material.
Although unsuccessful up to now, there have been
efforts by terrorists and criminal networks to acquire
such material (NTI, no date; Shuster, 2018; US NRC,
2018).
The part of Somalia that has the greatest uranium
deposits is relatively insecure, and AS and IS must both
be taken seriously as actors that might obtain access to
Somali uranium. The Galmudug FMS authorities are
only partly in control and are conducting an armed
struggle with AS, aided by the Sufi Ahlu Suna Wal
Jama (ASWJ) militia, the African Union Mission in
Somalia, US air strikes, the FGS National Army and US-
trained FGS special forces. In January 2018, in an event
chaired by FGS President Mohamed Abdullahi
Mohamed ‘Farmaajo’, the ASWJ and Galmudug FMS
merged formally. Despite progress such as this, the
merger process has not been smooth and may fall
apart completely (HIPS, 2019). Furthermore, AS and
IS continue to be robust and effective beyond
Galmudug FMS. In October 2016 IS took control of
Puntland port town Qandala before being expelled in
December of that year (ICG, 2016). Since 2018, IS has
continued to expand its operations in Puntland and
south central Somalia (Weiss, 2019). IS has had some
success in recruiting AS members, while AS has
responded by killing those within AS it suspects of
actual or potential disloyalty and hunting down IS
members (Maruf & Joseph, 2018, ch., 16). AS pledged
allegiance to al-Qaeda (AQ) in 2012. An indication of
the escalating regional threat AS poses is that it is
increasingly transcending its Somali origins in terms of
East African operatives and pro-AQ ideology, as evi-
denced by its 15 January 2019 attack in Nairobi which
killed 31 and injured 28 (Bryden & Bahra, 2019).
In contrast to south central and Puntland, the situa-
tion in Somaliland is more reassuring in relation to
nuclear issues – the uranium deposits are insignificant
economically and it has much better security from ter-
rorism. Somaliland’s unilateral secession from Somalia
in 1991 is internationally unrecognised. Nevertheless, it
is de facto self-governing and has a functioning state,
albeit one with a low level of capacity. With the approval
or at least acquiescence of the FGS, international actors
engage with the Government of Somaliland through
what is called the Special Arrangement. Somaliland’s
minor uranium ore reserves are located in its peaceful
western region. Hence they are distant from
Somaliland’s eastern region which is claimed by
Puntland and in which there are intermittent low-
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intensity armed clashes that also involve clans and sub-
clans. AS has not launched an attack in Somaliland since
2008. Any presence or support AS has in Somaliland is
limited by the fact that the area is dominated by the
Isaaq clan whereas AS, while it has had some success at
both transcending and exploiting clans, mainly draws
on the Rahanweyn clan and has recruited few Isaaq
(Hiraal Institute, 2018). The Somaliland population are
united in their rejection of AS; the people, in part
through a system of urban neighbourhood watch, are
vigilant and report to the authorities any suspicious
people or activities. These points should not be over-
stated, as can be seen from the fact that the AS leader
Ahmed Abdi Godane, killed in a US airstrike in 2014,
was an Isaaq from Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa (Maruf
& Joseph, 2018, p. 234–246). There may be an AS pre-
sence in Somaliland and it could become much more
active if AS decided there was strategic advantage in
making it so.
Vulnerability to nuclear dumping
In the 1980s and especially in the wake of the collapse of
the state of Somalia in 1990, criminal gangs sought to
dump nuclear waste and other toxic materials illegally
on land in Somalia and off its coast. These facts initially
surfaced as allegations in local Somali media and were
repeated by Mostafa Tolba, head of the UN
Environment Programme (UNEP) in December 1991
and in a UNEP statement in September 1992; this in
turn generated international news media coverage (e.g.
MacKenzie, 1992). Evidence in the form of documents,
wire taps and testimonials by some of those involved
proves that various combinations of the Calabrian mafia
in Italy called the ‘Ndrangheta, other professional crim-
inals, corrupt politicians and officials, and Italian and
Swiss companies intended and planned to engage in
toxic – including nuclear – waste dumping in Somalia
and in its waters, in some cases with the agreement of
Somalis in their pay. The salience of an Italian interest in
Somalia is partly explained by its previous role as the
colonial power in Puntland and south central Somalia
(whereas Britain was the colonial power in Somaliland).
The main driver was to make money by disposing of
toxic waste at a much lower cost than would be possible
in Europe by legal means and hence to take advantage of
Somalia’s civil war, state weakness and state collapse.
While toxic waste dumping elsewhere by the ecomafia
has been proven, we do not have public, verifiable proof
in the form of scientifically identified toxic materials
that the plans were carried out i.e. that nuclear dumping
actually occurred in Somalia or off its coast. Instead, we
have numerous, often quite specific, claims, some of
which could be used as the basis of worthwhile field-
work even now after the passage of a considerable
amount of time. Some observers have deduced the pos-
sible presence of toxic materials due to reports of inci-
dences and patterns of illness and death in the local
population but no scientifically valid diagnostic or epi-
demiological research has been carried out. Existing
documents that could be analysed for further leads and
there is potential for interviews as many of those
involved are still alive. Even if it turns out that no
nuclear or other toxic waste was dumped in Somalia
or off its shores, the fact that there was the demonstrated
intent and planning to do so to take advantage of
Somalia’s lack of ability to control its land and seas
shows that the lack of a capability for monitoring is an
incentive to exploit state weakness. We now set out the
most important findings and allegations in relation to
nuclear dumping. We have organised them around
groupings of perspectives – Italian and other
European, UN and then Somali.
Italian and other European perspectives
The illegal disposal of hazardous waste on a massive
scale by an ‘ecomafia’ of Italian companies and criminal
gangs is a long-established fact; the term ‘ecomafia’ was
coined by Italian Non-Governmental Organisation
(NGO) Legambiente in 1994 (Massari & Monzini,
2004, p. 289). Iliari Alpi, an Italian journalist, and her
Italian camera operator, Miran Hrovatin, were mur-
dered in Mogadishu on 20 March 1994. Somali citizen
Hashi Omar Hassan was convicted in Italy of the double
murder. ‘Ndrangheta member Francesci Fonti claimed
in 2009 that Alpi and Hrovatin were killed because they
had witnessed the arrival of toxic waste in the Puntland
port of Bosaso (Hooper, 2006). Hassan served sixteen
years of a twenty seven year sentence before being
paroled in 2015. His conviction was overturned in
2016 by an Italian court and in 2018 the Italian autho-
rities considered reopening the case based on wiretap
evidence gathered in 2012 (ANSA, 2018). The Alpi-
Hrovatin case and its connections to the ecomafia is
an ongoing cause célèbre in Italy, as can be seen from
the publication of various non-academic books (princi-
pally, Carazzolo, Chiara, & Scalettari, 2002; Cavalli,
2014; Carnì, 2018; Grimaldi & Scalettari, 2019;
Lucarelli, 2018) including one by Alpi’s mother (Alpi,
2017), plus documentaries on Italian television (Minoli,
2013; Moreira, 2010).
The Italian authorities investigated the issue of the
ecomafia and its use of ‘toxic ships’ and ‘disposable
ships’ (to be filled with toxic waste, taken out to sea
and sunk) extensively between 1994 and 2018. In the
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process they gathered a vast amount of evidence and
produced numerous reports. A list of official documents
released in 2014 runs into the thousands of items in
Italian (Greenpeace Italy, 2014) – and all of this is in
addition to the many official Italian reports that have
always been in the public domain. The Commission of
Inquiry set up an online archive of public and declassi-
fied documents and audiovisual materials. The docu-
ments section lists over 2,000 items from 1973 to 2006,
including 225 declassified ones (ASPI, no date). The
Italian authorities’ investigations were sprawling in
their coverage, and systematic analysis of the materials
with a focus on Somalia – including dumping at sea –
has not yet been conducted. The fact that some testi-
mony has been disproven underlines the need for direct
checking of claims though fieldwork. For example, in
2006, Francesco Fonti, a former ‘Ndragheta boss turned
informer, said that he was directly involved in sending
toxic waste to Somalia and sinking ships off the Italian
coast loaded with toxic waste. In 2009, prosecutors
located one ship off south-western Italy where Fonti
said one would be, but it turned out to be a wreck
from the First World War (Willan, 2001; Hooper,
2006; CPI, 2013, p. 105–106).
The existence of schemes to dump toxic, including
nuclear, waste in Somalia has been proven. Even those
that were exposed – and terminated as a result of that
exposure before they were implemented – are still impor-
tant because they are evidence of intent. Furthermore,
some of these schemes reached an advanced stage of
preparation.
Uranus 2 was one such project proving intent.
Franco Oliva, an Italian aid worker in Somalia from
1986 to 1990, told the Commission of Inquiry that
Guido Garelli, an Italian businessman based in
Mogadishu, who he met there before 1990, was sur-
prisingly open with him. Garelli told him that he was
working with Giancarlo Marocchino (an Italian fixer
based in Mogadishu and a central figure in ecomafia
operations regarding Somalia) and some Somali offi-
cials to dispose of nuclear waste in the country. Uranus
1 was the code name of the ecomafia’s project to dump
toxic waste in the Sahara; Garelli was working to
extend it to Somalia as Uranus 2 (CPI, 1995, 32. See
also Carazzolo, Chiara, & Scalettari, 1998; Kingston,
2007; Greenpeace Italy, 2010; EJS, 2011). An entrepre-
neur in the Lombard region of Italy informed the
Italian authorities that he had been contacted by
Professor Ezio Scaglione of Alessandria to see if he
would be interested in working with him to export
toxic, including radioactive, waste to Somalia as part
of Uranus 2. The Italian authorities established surveil-
lance and discovered that Marocchino was closely
involved with the plan and appeared to be experienced
in such operations. Marocchino proposed the rapid
shipment of two or three thousand barrels of toxic
waste, claimed that he had the cooperation of local
clan leader, Ali Mahdi Mohammed, and indicated
that ‘El Bahraf’ (Ceel Baraf near Mahaday Weyne
north of Mogadishu) had been selected for the most
dangerous materials. Marocchini and Scaglione also
said that they would misrepresent the site as an incin-
erator for urban waste in order to overcome concerns
of clan leaders (CPI, 2003, 4–6. See also, 2018, 84–91;
Huband, 1992). Mohammed received some interna-
tional backing for his claim to be President of
Somalia between 1991 and 1997 but exerted little con-
trol outside of Mogadishu. An official document signed
by Mohammed and dated 19 August 1996 authorised
Scaglione to establish and run a plant for processing
waste in Somalia before the plot was exposed and shut
down (Office of the President, Somali Republic, 1996.
See also Greenpeace Italy, 2010, p. 22).
Another significant plan proving intent to use
Somalia to dump nuclear waste involved Italian citi-
zen Giorgio Comerio. At the end of the 1980s he
represented a company called Ocean Disposal
Management (ODM) which proposed using free fall
penetrators to drive radioactive waste from wealthy
countries into the seabed in the vicinity of mainly
poor countries (ODM (Ocean Disposal Management
Inc), 1983). The company approached many coun-
tries, including Somalia in July 1989 (State
Prosecutor, Reggio Calabria, 1995). ODM came
close to securing deals with the Ukraine, Russia and
North Korea for such work but the exposure of these
activities brought them to an end in 1996 (CPI, 2018,
90; Greenpeace Italy, 2010, p. 20).
The two cases in which the evidence is strongest that
toxic, possibly including radioactive, waste was actually
disposed of on land in Somalia are those relating to the
Bosaso-Garowe road in Puntland and to the construction
of the small Ceel Macaan port near Mogadishu. We also
assess the evidence of possible nuclear dumping at
Xaafun as sufficient to make it a priority for investigation.
We havemarked all three on our map (see Figure 1). This
should not be interpreted as meaning that no other
claims are worth investigating, only that these three are
our top initial priorities based on current understanding.
Reporting through the proposed system could change
those priorities. Furthermore, as many locations along
the coast of south central Somalia and Puntland have
been identified as possible locations of washed up suspect
objects, the operators could engage in systematic surveys
using the aerial drone system we suggest to investigate
these locations.
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Regarding the first main case, the dumping seems to
have occurred between December 1987 and January 1988
during the construction of the road between Garowe and
Bosaso in Puntland. The Commission of Inquiry found
evidence of this toxic waste dumping to be reliable
because it was detailed, came from multiple sources,
included direct admissions gathered from wire taps, was
not contradicted by others involved in the work and
because journalist Luciano Scalettari had Global
Positioning System (GPS) coordinates and detected
metallic material underground using a magnetometer in
the locations indicated to them by some of those
involved, including two truck drivers. However, they
did not dig up the metal objects and their contents for
testing. The truck drivers said they were told the contain-
ers, which weighed around 20 kilogrammes each, con-
tained ‘expired paint’. One site was 90 kilometres and the
other 140 kilometres down the road from Bosaso to
Garowe. The wiretaps about this scheme include refer-
ences to the waste as including ‘uranium’ and ‘yellow
cake’ (CPI, 2006, 96–102; EJS (Environmental Justice
for Somalia), 2011, 7ʹ43”-8ʹ24”; Greenpeace Italy, 2010,
24–25; Hussein, 2010a).
Regarding the second case, Scaglione told the Italian
authorities that, during the construction of the Ceel
Macaan port in 1996 to 1998, Marocchino told him
that he was able to dispose of radioactive waste in con-
tainers that would form part of the foundations of the
quay. Giancarlo Ricchi who was working in the port
took five photographs, supposedly of the containers,
and said that Somali workers estimated that about four
hundred containers had been buried. The photos are
now public but they are unclear and exact knowledge of
the contents of the containers has never been estab-
lished (CPI, 2004, p. 25–26).
The Alpi-Hrovatin case and the work of the Italian
authorities inspired a team of Italian and Swiss journal-
ists to travel to numerous locations in Somalia in 1998
as part of a six-month investigation into toxic waste
dumping in Somalia. They published their findings in
the Italian newspaper Famiglia Cristiana (Carazzolo
et al., 1998) and also gave evidence to the Italian
Parliament. They made four new major claims. First,
General Mohammed Said Hersi ‘Morgan’, the Minister
of Defence from 1990–1991 for dictator Siad Barre and
then warlord who controlled Kismayo in Jubbaland
from the end of 1993 until 1999, told them that
unnamed foreign companies approached him for land
on which to store radioactive and other toxic but he
refused. Second, according to Morgan nuclear waste was
burned in the vicinity of Warsheikh, on the coast north
of Mogadishu, in 1992. Third, according to Aldo
Anghessa, an Italian arms dealer who had cooperated
with the Italian secret service, one dumping project, for
nuclear waste, was named ‘Salt Island’ after the salt pans
in the Xaafun peninsula in Puntland. The site was on the
uninhabited north west of the peninsula, accessible only
by sea. Also according to Anghessa, this was one of five
such sites on the central and northern coast of Somalia.
Garelli told the Italian authorities that US radioactive
waste was dumped in a remote area of the Xaafun
peninsula, guarded by people with Stinger missiles
(CPI, 2004, p. 24). Fourth, an unspecified source told
them that a warehouse of toxic materials encased in
concrete and guarded by non-Somalis five miles inland
and six miles north of the coastal town of Hobyo in
Galmudug was established, with dumps in some other
locations underground. Fifth, they gathered additional
detail to that already known relating to claims that
unusual patterns of illness and death among people
and animals occurred in Somalia between 1995 and
1998 (see also Weyler, 2006; Hassan, 2009, 13–14,
37–40). The evidence and allegations compiled by the
journalists and set out in the further exploration by the
Italian authorities are sufficiently concrete to enable
evaluation of some of them on the ground.
UN perspectives
For its part, the UN verified as far back as the early 1990s
that efforts weremade by the ecomafia to launch projects to
dispose of toxic waste in Somalia and off its coast and
investigated further on occasion. In December 1991,
Tolba stated that Italian and Swiss waste-trading compa-
nies – which he did not name – had agreed a twenty year
contract with Nur Elmy Osman, the self-proclaimed
Minister of Health in a Somali civil war faction, to establish
and run in the vicinity of Mogadishu a plant to store or
incinerate up to half a million tons of hospital and indus-
trial waste annually and would pay their Somali counter-
parts US$80 million in return. In September 1992 New
Scientist reported that it had obtained a copy of the con-
tract, which showed that Swiss companyAchair & Partners
was the one involved (MacKenzie, 1992). There is no
evidence that the plant was built or the waste actually
shipped, and the contract was rescinded when it was
exposed, with Achair & Partners and another Italian com-
pany Progresso Srl run byMarcello Giannoni both turning
out to be front companies created to facilitate the deal
(Greenpeace Italy, 2010, p. 22). Tolba also indicated that
a Swiss company was planning to use two incinerator ships
that would operate near the coast of Somalia. What hap-
pened with them has not been established, although incin-
erator ships, designed to dispose of toxic wastes as
a cheaper and less legally challenging alternative to trying
to secure permission for disposal or incineration on land,
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did exist in the 1980s (Stammer, 1985). In 1992 theUN sent
two missions to Somaliland, gathered some field samples
and conducted some stakeholder interviews but found no
evidence of toxic waste (UN SC, 2011). UNEP commis-
sionedMahdi Gedi Qayad, a Professor of Chemistry at the
University ofMogadishu, to investigate the waste dumping
claims from 10 May to 8 June 1997 (Qayad, 1997).
According to the Italian and Swiss team of journalists,
Qayad’s report included photos and video of an object on
the beach between Cige and Mareed near Adale north of
Mogadishu that fishermen said had made them ill; the
death of a fisherman after contact with an object on the
beach at Baraawe (also known as Brava); and claims of
hazardous waste in the vicinity of a number of places
including Jamaame near Kismayo and in the Shebelle
River swamps at Lambar 50 between Merka and
Mogadishu. The report has not been made public and the
journalists indicated that they had obtained a copy but have
not made it public either (Carazzolo et al., 1998).
The UN took a renewed interest in these issues after
the tsunami of December 2004, which resulted in
objects washing up on the coast of Puntland and south
central Somalia that some worried contained nuclear or
other toxic waste. There was sufficient concern to trigger
a UNEP investigation. The UNEP rapid desk assessment
carried out in February 2005 was part of its response to
all countries impacted by the tsunami. The report made
the following claims:
Starting from the early 1980s and continuing into the
civil war, the hazardous waste dumped along Somalia’s
coast comprised uranium radioactive waste, lead, cad-
mium, mercury, industrial, hospital, chemical, leather
treatment and other toxic waste. Most of the waste was
simply dumped on the beaches in containers and dis-
posable leaking barrels which ranged from small to big
tanks without regard to the health of the local popula-
tion and any environmentally devastating impacts
(UNEP, 2005, p. 134).
The report framed such dumping as a ‘violation of
international treaties’ regarding hazardous waste
exports and criticised any agreements with a divided
government unable to enforce environmental standards
or legal safeguards. It summarised the situation as
follows:
The impact of the tsunami stirred up hazardous waste
deposits on the beaches around North Hobyo (South
Mudug) and Warsheik (North of Benadir).
Contamination from the waste deposits has thus caused
health and environmental problems to the surrounding
local fishing communities including contamination of
groundwater. Many people in these towns have com-
plained of unusual health problems as a result of the
tsunami winds blowing towards inland villages. The
health problems include acute respiratory infections,
dry heavy coughing andmouth bleeding, abdominal hae-
morrhages, unusual skin chemical reactions, and sudden
death after inhaling toxic materials (UNEP, 2005, p. 134).
The report concluded that ‘dumping of toxic and
harmful waste is rampant in the sea, on the shores
and in the hinterland’ (UNEP, 2005, p. 129). It
asserted that a key motive for the dumping was the
relative cheapness of doing so in Africa in comparison
with Europe. It included a map of unspecified origin
indicating eleven toxic waste sites along the coast and
a further four inland in south central Somalia and
Puntland; a photograph provided by the Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia of a suspect drum on
the shore on an unspecified location; and a photo of
an unspecified hole in the ground provided by
a resident of Hobyo (UNEP, 2005, p. 135). Other
than this, the report provided no supporting evidence
and so appears to be a summary of allegations. In
March 2005, UNEP spokesman Nick Nuttall said the
following:
Initial reports indicate that the tsunami waves broke
open containers full of toxic waste and scattered the
contents. We are talking about everything frommedical
waste to chemical waste products . . . We know this
material is on the land and is now being blown around
and possibly carried to villages. What we do not know is
the full extent of the problem . . . We need more infor-
mation. We need to find out what has been going on
there, but there is real cause for concern . . . We now
need to urgently send in a multi-agency expert mission,
led by UNEP, for a full investigation.
Nuttall also said that a UN assessment mission to
Somalia found some Somalis in the north to have ill-
nesses consistent with radiation sickness (Clayton,
2005). However, no such mission seems to have been
sent although one was planned initially but postponed
for security reasons. In May 2005 the UN took water
samples at the Puntland coastal towns of Xaafun,
Bandarbayla and Eyl but found no evidence of toxic
waste (UN CTS, 2005). The scientific report has not
been made public, although Somali researcher Zeinab
Hassan reports having seen a copy (Hassan, 2009, p. 12).
Since its flurry of UN activity in 2004–05, the UN has
continued to draw attention periodically to the issue. In
2008 UNEP spokesman Nick Nuttall was unequivocal
and dramatic:
Somalia has been used as a dumping ground for hazar-
dous waste starting in the early 1990s, and continuing
through the civil war there . . . The waste is many dif-
ferent kinds. There is uranium radioactive waste. There
is lead, and heavy metals like cadmium and mercury.
There is also industrial waste, and there are hospital
wastes, chemical wastes – you name it . . . What is most
alarming here is that nuclear waste is being dumped.
8 E. HERRING ET AL.
Radioactive uranium waste that is potentially killing
Somalis and completely destroying the ocean (Quoted
in Abdullahi, 2008).
Special Representative for the UN Secretary General in
Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah concurred with these
views: ‘There is no government control . . . and there are
few people with high moral ground . . . yes, people in
high positions are being paid off, but because of the
fragility of the Transitional Federal Government, some
of these companies now no longer ask the authorities –
they simply dump their waste and leave’ (Quoted in
Abdullahi, 2008. See also AFP, 2008). Ould-Abdallah
sad that he had ‘reliable information’, which he did
not reveal, that Asian as well as European companies
were dumping toxic, including nuclear, waste off
Somalia’s coast. The most recent major UN statement
was made on 25 October 2011, when then Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon summarised the position for the
Security Council as follows:
Allegations of the illegal dumping of various types of
waste, including radioactive, hazardous and medical, on
land and in Somali waters, have been made for almost
20 years. Circumstantial evidence indicates that the
dumping of illegal waste occurred during the 1990s,
but verification has not been possible due to the security
situation in Somalia. Further investigations are needed
to ascertain the validity of both historic and more recent
claims. Information about illegal hazardous waste
dumping off the coast of Somalia is unconfirmed, but
stems from reputable sources and related data (UN SC,
2011, p. 12-13).
In essence, then, the UN line is that there is credible
evidence of toxic waste dumping but that systematic
fieldwork is required to evaluate the claims properly.
Somali perspectives
Foreign toxic waste dumping has for many years been
a matter of intense interest among Somalis but this has
not translated into any in-depth and verifiable Somali
research, mainly due to the lack of resources and train-
ing for such research among them. Two brief syntheses
and commentaries by Somalis – Abdullahi Elmi
Mohamed and Mohamed Abshir Waldo – have become
quite well known among those focused on Somali affairs
(Mohamed, 2001; Waldo, 2008). One slightly longer one
by Bashir Mohamed Hussein is also in circulation; this is
based mainly on some of the sources already discussed
above, with some additional references to items in the
Italian news media, especially in relation to patterns of
illness in Somalia perceived by some medical practi-
tioners to be unusual (Hussein, 2010a, p. 10–13). This
report contains a photo attributed to the Somali news
website dayniile.com of a man in the Lower Shabelle
region of Somalia with a severe unspecified skin condi-
tion. There is no indication of who took the photograph
or whether the skin condition or its cause has been
identified. In another short paper, Somali Abdulkadir
Egal argues tentatively that the cancer rate in Somalia
has increased since 1993 and that this increase may be
due to the presence of toxic waste (Egal, 2009). He
obtained information from the Red Crescent Hospital
in Dubai about the place of residence, age and gender of
thirteen Somali cancer patients in 2003–04 and com-
bined that with familiar general information about
dumping. The paper, as the author accepts, is specula-
tive and inconclusive.
The most important investigation involving field-
work by anyone into the dumping claims was carried
out in April-May 2006 by Mogadishu-based Somali
Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Daryeel
Bulsho Guud (DBG – Community Care for All).
A German aid organisation (possibly Diakonie
Emergency Aid or Bread for the World, Germany –
DBG was affiliated to both) funded equipment, protec-
tive gear and training from a consultant to carry out the
research. DBG claimed to have confirmed that fifteen
containers it examined on the coast of Somalia con-
tained ‘nuclear and toxic wastes’. According to Zeinab
Hassan, the areas they indicated were around half of the
coastal districts from Hobyo southwards: ‘Iidan coast
(Hobyo district); Hin Dawa’o, Fah, and Qosoltire coasts
(Harardhere district); Waahweyn and Mareg coasts
(Eldher district); Jamal coast (Adale district); Havai
coast (Mogadishu coastline); Hijo-mahad coast
(Barave district); El-Bakari, El-Shid, Esole, El-lahelay,
and El-Ganane coasts (Jamama district); and Koyamo
coast (Kismayu district)’ (Hassan, 2009, 10. For some of
the photos see also Milton, 2009; Hussein, 2010b).
Hassan’s short paper is the most thorough and critically
engaged piece by a Somali on the dumping issue. It
supplements the usual sources with interviews, includ-
ing with DBG staff, conducted in person in south central
Somalia and Nairobi and on the phone. Her paper
includes thirteen photos by DDG of containers, more
than any other source referring to the DBG report. They
are photos of metal cylinders on beaches about three
metres long and two metres in diameter, in many cases
being inspected by two people wearing gas masks and
orange protective clothing. While DBG showed Hassan
their report, they declined to give her a copy. DBG has
not published its report subsequently and has not
responded to a request from us for a copy, and so it is
not possible to evaluate its validity.
A widespread, though not universal, view among
Somalis is that Somali piracy is a defensive response to
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illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) foreign fish-
ing and toxic waste dumping (e.g. Abdullahi, 2008).
This narrative is one that Somali pirates themselves
espouse; it has the advantages of positively framing
their identity and legitimating their behaviour to them-
selves and others, both locally and internationally
(Bueger, 2013). Stig Jarle Hansen (2011) has argued
that Somali piracy is essentially about the pursuit of
profit rather than the defence of fishing and the envir-
onment, with the defensive motivation as mere rationa-
lisation that should be undermined. However, this does
not account for why Somali piracy increased from
around 2001 and escalated from 2005 until it was sup-
pressed from 2012 onwards. IUU fishing in Somali
waters was rampant in the lead up to and during this
period, including close to the shore, as foreign fishing
vessels exploited the weakness of the state. Both sides in
this conflict between foreign fishing vessels and local
fishermen armed themselves and it escalated. Over time
to a great extent, but not exclusively, it became the
pursuit of profit from ransom by criminal pirate gangs,
with the defensive motivation as rationalisation. In
other words, as Awet Tewelde Weldemichael (2019)
argues, the impact of foreign fishing fleets and indigna-
tion due to the belief that toxic waste was being dumped
contributed materially to the rise in piracy; criminal
pursuit of profit is not the whole story.
A system to address Somalia’s nuclear issues
The nuclear security system proposed below if imple-
mented would address all four of the nuclear security
issues identified in this article – lack of an IAEA nuclear
security regime, vulnerability to smuggling of uranium
ore, potential terrorist access to materials for radioactive
dirty bombs and vulnerability to nuclear dumping. It
could do so by fingerprinting Somalia’s uranium ore
deposits so that they are traceable to their origins should
they be smuggled abroad illegally; deploying a system of
covert sensors to detect and report illegal movement of
uranium ore; crowdsourced reporting via a mobile
phone app of suspected radiological material (whether
from possible historic dumping or contemporary ura-
nium ore smuggling); and capabilities for assessing the
presence of radiological materials through aerial, under-
water and ground surveys. Securing and cleaning up of
any nuclear materials located, identification of waste
dumping culprits and their possible prosecution or
action against would-be uranium ore smugglers or
dirty bomb terrorists would be a matter for the relevant
national and international authorities. The system needs
to be designed and deployed in a way that protects
society, property and the environment from the harms
associated with the nuclear security vulnerabilities iden-
tified while not unintentionally creating other harms
such as panic or incentives for hostile entities to disrupt
or exploit these systems. The system would have to
comply with the relevant UN, IAEA, EU and national
(especially UK and US) legal and regulatory require-
ments, most obviously as they relate to export controls,
arms embargoes, dual use technology transfers (that is,
transfer of civilian technologies such as drones with
potential military applications), knowledge transfers,
bribery and corruption, data security and the move-
ment, storage and disposal of uranium ore samples. It
could be supplemented in a variety of ways, principally
through the use of satellites or epidemiological research.
We now consider in turn the key tasks of the proposed
nuclear security system, i.e. fingerprinting uranium ore
deposits, deployment of covert sensors, rolling out of
a mobile phone app and creating of capabilities to sur-
vey for (and respond to sensor and mobile phone app
reports of the movement or presence of) radiological
material. We conclude this section by outlining the
expected results of the deployment of such a system.
Fingerprinting Somalia’s uranium ore deposits
The main purpose of the uranium fingerprinting strand
would be to produce a forensic database of the unique
characteristics (‘fingerprints’) of the uranium in
Somalia. If uranium ore then turns up somewhere in
transit through Somalia or outside Somalia, it could be
tested and compared to the fingerprint database. The
system operators would collect uranium deposit sam-
ples. The sample locations and sample frequency would
be determined from initial aerial drone surveys, back-
pack radiation mapping systems and measurement
results. The equipment required for such work is not
complex or costly; the team would need Personal
Protective Equipment suits, sampling kits, Geiger coun-
ters, backpack radiation mapping systems, petrological
microscopes, aerial drones with radiation mapping pay-
loads, a laptop to collect and process data in real-time,
a polisher and set of polishing equipment, a thin section
prep instrument and an X-ray Fluorescence machine.
The samples could then be shipped abroad to a partner
country for more in depth analysis requiring more
advanced equipment not available in Somalia. The
mineralogy and major element analysis would have to
be carried out using Scanning Electron Microscopy/
Energy Dispersive Microscopy. Trace and rare earth
element impurities could be measured using Electron
Probe Micro-Analysis and isotope analysis could be
performed using an Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass
Spectrometer.
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Deployment of sensors to detect movement of
uranium ore
One way to detect unauthorised movement of material
from uranium deposits is to measure fluctuations in
radiation at tactical locations like roads, checkpoints,
bridges, ports and so on. Somalia’s nuclear security
system should have camouflaged, autonomous, tamper-
proof radiation sensors that are appropriately robust,
inexpensive and low maintenance while still carrying
out what is required of them. The sensor system should
be deployed in the vicinity of the uranium deposits in
Galmudug, between the deposits and the seaports of
Mogadishu and Bosaso, and at additional locations
identified through risk assessment. The system could
be based on sensors originally developed for seismic
applications; such sensors measure parameters such as
ground acceleration along three axes, temperature and
pressure on a regular basis. When a seismic event
occurs, the sampling rate goes up. The sensors should
be equipped with Geiger-Müller or Chemical Vapour
Deposition diamond modules to detect radioactivity
and should be equipped with a small camera. The sen-
sors should be battery powered and upload their data
over the Global System for Mobile communication net-
work every hour to the same database that could be used
for the mobile phone app discussed below. If a signal
was detected by several sensors along the same road in
sequence, the system operators would know the direc-
tion of travel. The sensors could be disguised as rocks or
other inconspicuous objects. The sensors could be tam-
per-proof by enabling them to monitor environmental
variables; any anomaly in temperature, humidity and
light level or a small mechanical shock or recording
incongruous photos or not receiving data at all, could
trigger an alarm in the central database. The anomaly
could be investigated on the ground to see if there has
been a technical fault or tampering and ascertain the
nature of that fault or tampering.
Rollout of a mobile phone app to report the possible
presence of radiological material
The Federal Government of Somalia could make
a mobile phone radiation dosimetry app available
openly as a free download. This would allow anyone,
such as a member of the public, a member of the
security forces or someone on a fishing boat, to report
an object they suspect of containing radioactive mate-
rial. The app could be designed to take a short movie,
which would give visual information on the object and,
more importantly, analysis of the images would allow
the system operators to detect emitted radiation. The
more intense the radiation, the more the digital movie
would be distorted in ways that the human eye cannot
see but which could be detected by the computer pro-
gramme which could issue an alert automatically. In
addition, a timestamp and GPS location could be stored.
The user could be asked to run the app at least twice
from slightly different locations to enable the system
operators to determine the source strength. Central
automated analysis in the database, which could use
the data of more than one user, would generate an
alert for the system operators. The person reporting
(i.e. running the app) should not receive automated
feedback on radiation readings. As a result, the system
would be useless to a hostile person who might want to
find and use nuclear material. It would also enable the
system operators to manage information securely while
providing safety advice to a friendly person in a way that
avoids creating panic. Users would be asked for permis-
sion to run the app in the background from time to
time. Combining the information of many users would
allow the system operators to detect areas with slightly
elevated background radiation, which could be gener-
ated by dumped waste, uranium ore deposits or stolen
uranium ore. The app could enable anyone with
a smartphone to report an initial assessment of the
possible presence of uranium ore or nuclear waste and
then move away if on land or, if at sea on a fishing boat,
drop the object back into the water which would act as
a radiation shield before the system operators come to
assess it. Enabling participation could enhance public
trust in the project and buy-in. In addition, the app in
effect massively broadens the potential survey area to
include anywhere that someone has a smartphone.
Somalia has excellent network coverage. Even if the
person does not have access to the network at that
particular moment, the app could be designed to upload
automatically once the phone is within network
coverage.
Creation of capabilities to survey for or evaluate
reports of the presence of radiological material
The system operators should have capabilities to carry
out surveys based on documentary or interview evi-
dence, sensor reports, mobile phone app alerts or
other reports such as word of mouth to determine con-
clusively whether dumped nuclear waste or illegally
obtained uranium ore is present. When arriving close
to a standard survey area or suspect area on land, the
system operators could monitor the radiation they are
exposed to using a Geiger counter. They could then start
surveying the area using an aerial drone with a radiation
mapping payload. This would allow them to assess the
GLOBAL SECURITY: HEALTH, SCIENCE AND POLICY 11
suspect object or area from a safe distance. The payload
should also contain a camera for visual inspection. The
system operators should also have a radiation mapping
backpack for surveying on foot. If it was safe enough,
the system operators could go closer and gather forensic
evidence in the form of photos and samples. All data
from all surveys and inspections could be sent in real-
time to the secure, central database which should also be
used for the mobile phone radiation dosimetry app. For
suspect objects in the sea the system operators could use
underwater drones with an optical tether which would
allow deployments of more than 500 metres from the
operator. The system operators could be provided with
a positioning system involving dead reckoning based on
the use of GPS (for when at the surface) integrated with
pressure/depth sensors and inertial measurement units
and supplemented either by a smart-tether system or
smart buoy.
Possible expected results
If the system we propose here were to be deployed, we
would expect that the following results would be possible:
● Claims of past nuclear dumping in Somalia or off
its coast could be evaluated.
● If nuclear waste was located it could be secured and
cleaned up, with benefit to the population and the
environment, and the basis laid for possible identi-
fication and prosecution of perpetrators. The
claims and information related to health symp-
toms, disease, and cancer could be followed up on
by researchers and health agencies through bio-
monitoring and epidemiological investigation to
understand health and disease outcomes over the
long-term. Establishing cause and effect relation-
ships would require specific sub-population and
population level monitoring and analyses.
● If surveys of relevant locations uncovered no evidence
of the presence of nuclear waste, the public and others
in Somalia and beyond could be reassured.
● Putting in place covert monitoring of Somalia’s ura-
nium ore deposits could assist deterrence, detection
and prevention of illegal, unauthorised movement of
such materials for nefarious purposes such as smug-
gling for export or for use in a dirty bomb.
● The system as a whole would be a vital element of
a credible IAEA-approved nuclear security regime
as part of Somalia’s steps towards becoming an
IAEA member.
● Such a capability would be a substantial symbolic
and practical contribution to the functioning of the
state.
● The record of likely and proven intent to dump
nuclear and other toxic waste on Somalia has gen-
erated a strong desire among Somalis to be able to
regulate their own environment in relation to
nuclear issues, and the system we suggest would
enable that.
● Somalis feel themselves to be the victims of past
direct colonialism and more recent ‘toxic colonial-
ism’ (Hussein, 2010a, 4). This manifests itself in
resentment at the deployment of the naval forces of
other countries to stop piracy while neglecting IUU
fishing and possible toxic including nuclear waste
dumping. The international cooperation required
for the system we suggest would help to overcome
that resentment by addressing some of the reasons
behind it.
● The infrastructure of the nuclear security system
we suggest could, with due attention to avoiding
potential downsides, have wider humanitarian and
development applications, such as mineral, agricul-
tural or wildlife surveying, or delivery of medical
supplies to hard-to-reach locations, so that it would
not sit idle when not engaged in nuclear security
duties.
● The system could be adapted for the nuclear secur-
ity and wider development needs of other low-
income countries.
In sum, a nuclear security system for Somalia of the kind
we are suggesting has much to recommend it.
Conclusion
We have reviewed the recent history of Somalia with
respect to nuclear materials and concern regarding
their potential use in dirty bombs. This history and
concern have prompted us to suggest a methodology
and system to assess the various possible instances of
smuggling, illegal movement of uranium ore and cred-
ibility of claims of nuclear waste dumping. The innova-
tive nuclear security system proposed in this article
addresses all four nuclear security issues faced by
Somalia – the lack of an IAEA nuclear security regime;
its vulnerability to uranium ore smuggling from its cur-
rently unsecured uranium deposits; the potential use of
its uranium ore by terrorists in a dirty bomb; and its
current inability to address past possible occurrences and
current vulnerability to being used as a site of nuclear
waste dumping on land and offshore. Somalia is making
efforts towards establishing an IAEA nuclear security
regime, supported by the IAEA. However, those efforts
cannot get far without the technical capabilities necessary
to underpin them. The system we suggest here is tailored
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to Somalia’s specific needs, desires and circumstances. At
present, Somalia has substantial uranium ore deposits
near the surface in Galmudug FMS which have not
been secured and which are not even monitored. The
system we suggest for uranium ore fingerprinting, static
tamper-proof sensors with automated alerting, crowd-
sourced reporting using a mobile phone app, plus aerial
and underwater drone surveying and evaluation is an
innovative, low cost design. It would provide integrated
monitoring of uranium ore deposits and an ability to
assess possible remnants from nuclear waste dumping on
land and at sea. The system we are suggesting is not
merely a technology-driven niche activity aimed at
something marginal to the lives of Somalis; it speaks to
a visceral, emotional aspect of identity, dignity and deco-
lonisation. The infrastructure that would be created
could easily be augmented for wider development pur-
poses and has the potential for adaptation to other low-
income country contexts.
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